America's Ignorant Voters

This year's election is sure to bring more lamentations about voter apathy. No less striking is the appalling political ignorance of the American electorate.

by Michael Schudson

Every week, the Tonight Show's Jay Leno takes to the streets of Los Angeles to quiz innocent passersby with some simple questions: On what bay is San Francisco located? Who was president of the United States during World War II? The audience roars as Leno's hapless victims fumble for answers. Was it Lincoln? Carter?

No pollster, let alone a college or high school history teacher, would be surprised by the poor showing of Leno's sample citizens. In a national assessment test in the late 1980s, only a third of American 17-year-olds could correctly locate the Civil War in the period 1850-1900; more than a quarter placed it in the 18th century. Two-thirds knew that Abraham Lincoln wrote the Emancipation Proclamation, which seems a respectable showing, but what about the 14 percent who said that Lincoln wrote the Bill of Rights, the 10 percent who checked the Missouri Compromise, and the nine percent who awarded Lincoln royalties for Uncle Tom's Cabin?

Asking questions about contemporary affairs doesn't yield any more encouraging results. In a 1996 national public opinion poll, only 10 percent of American adults could identify William Rehnquist as the chief justice of the Supreme Court. In the same survey, conducted at the height of Newt Gingrich's celebrity as Speaker of the House, only 59 percent could identify the job he held. Americans sometimes demonstrate deeper knowledge about a major issue before the nation, such as the Vietnam War, but most could not describe the thrust of the Clinton health care plan or tell whether the Reagan administration supported the Sandinistas or the contras during the conflict in Nicaragua (and only a third could place that country in Central America).

It can be misleading to make direct comparisons with other countries, but the general level of political awareness in leading liberal democracies overseas does seem to be much higher. While 58 percent of the Germans surveyed, 32 percent of the French, and 22 percent of the British were able to identify Boutros Boutros-Ghali as secretary general of the United Nations in 1994, only 13 percent of Americans could do so. Nearly all Germans polled could name Boris Yeltsin as Russia's leader, as could 63 percent of the British, 61 percent of the French, but only 50 percent of the Americans.

How can the United States claim to be a model democracy if its citizens know so little about political life? That question has aroused political reformers and preoccupied many political scientists since the early 20th century. It can't be answered without some historical perspective.

Today's mantra that the "informed citizen" is the foundation of effective democracy was not a central part of the nation's founding vision. It is largely the creation of late-19th-century Mugwump and Progressive reformers, who recoiled from the spectacle of powerful political parties using government as a job bank for their friends and a cornucopia of contracts for their relatives. (In those days before the National Endowment for the Arts, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Herman Melville, and Walt Whitman all subsidized their writing by holding down federal patronage appointments.) Voter turnout in the late 19th century was extraordinarily high by today's standards, routinely over 70 percent in presidential elections, and there is no doubt that parades, free whiskey, free-floating money, patronage jobs, and the pleasures of fraternity all played a big part in the political enthusiasm of ordinary Americans.

The reformers saw this kind of politics as a betrayal of democratic ideals. A democratic public, they believed,
must reason together. That ideal was threatened by
mindless enthusiasm, the wily maneuvers of political
machines, and the vulnerability of the new immigrant
masses in the nation's big cities, woefully ignorant of
Anglo-Saxon traditions, to manipulation by party hacks.
E. L. Godkin, founding editor of the Nation and a leading
reformer, argued that "there is no corner of our system
in which the hastily made and ignorant foreign voter
may not be found eating away the political structure,
like a white ant, with a group of natives standing over
him and encouraging him."

This was in 1893, by which point a whole set of re-
forms had been put in place. Civil service reform
reduced patronage. Ballot reform irrevocably altered the
act of voting itself. For most of the 19th century, parties
distributed at the polls their own "tickets," listing only
their own candidates for office. A voter simply took a
ticket from a party worker and deposited it in the ballot
box, without needing to read it or mark it in any way.
Voting was thus a public act of party affiliation. Begin-
ing in 1888, however, and spreading across the country
by 1896, this system was replaced with government-
printed ballots that listed all the candidates from each
eligible party. The voter marked the ballot in secret, as
we do today, in an act that affirmed voting as an indi-
cidual choice rather than a social act of party loyalty.
Political parades and other public spectacles increasingly
gave way to pamphlets in what reformers dubbed "edu-
cational" political campaigns. Leading newspapers, once

little more than organs of the political parties, began to
declare their independence and to portray themselves as
nonpartisan commercial institutions of public enlighten-
ment and public-minded criticism. Public secondary
education began to spread.

These and other reforms enshrined the informed citi-
zen as the foundation of democracy, but at a tremendous
cost: Voter turnout plummeted. In the presidential elec-
tion of 1920, it dropped to 49 percent, its lowest point
in the 20th century—until it was matched in 1996. Ever
since, political scientists and others have been plumbing
the mystery created by the new model of an informed
citizenry: How can so many, knowing so little, and vot-
ing in such small numbers, build a democracy that ap-
ppears to be (relatively) successful?

There are several responses to that question. The first
is that a certain amount of political ignorance is an
inevitable byproduct of America's unique political envi-
ronment. One reason Americans have so much difficulty
grasping the political facts of life is that their political
system is the world's most complex. Ask the next politi-
cal science Ph.D. you meet to explain what government
agencies at what level—federal, state, county, or city—
take responsibility for the homeless. Or whom he or she
voted for in the last election for municipal judge. The
answers might make Jay Leno's victims seem less ridicu-
ious. No European country has as many elections, as
many elected offices, as complex a maze of overlapping
governmental jurisdictions, as the American system. It is
simply harder to "read" U.S. politics than the politics of
most nations.

The hurdle of political comprehension is raised a
notch higher by the ideological inconsistencies of Ameri-
can political parties. In Britain, a voter can confidently
 cast a vote without knowing a great deal about the par-
ticular candidates on the ballot. The Labor candidate
generally can be counted on to follow the Labor line, the
Conservative to follow the Tory line. An American voter
casting a ballot for a Democrat or Republican has no
such assurance. Citizens in other countries need only dog
paddle to be in the political swim; in the United States
they need the skills of a scuba diver.

If the complexity of U.S. political institutions helps ex-
plain American ignorance of domestic politics, geopoliti-
cal factors help explain American backwardness in
foreign affairs. There is a kind of ecology of political igno-
rance at work. The United States is far from Europe
and borders only two other countries. With a vast do-
mestic market, most of its producers have relatively few
dealings with customers in other countries, globalization
notwithstanding. Americans, lacking the parliamentary
form of government that prevails in most other democ-
racies, are also likely to find much of what they read or
hear about the wider world politically opaque. And the
simple fact of America's political and cultural super-
power status naturally limits citizens’ political awareness. Just as employees gossip more about the boss than the boss gossips about them, so Italians and Brazilians know more about the United States than Americans know about their countries.

Consider a thought experiment. Imagine what would happen if you transported those relatively well-informed Germans or Britons to the United States with their cultural heritage, schools, and news media intact. If you checked on them again about a generation later, after long exposure to the distinctive American political environment—its geographic isolation, superpower status, complex political system, and weak parties—would they have the political knowledge levels of Europeans or Americans? Most likely, I think, they would have developed typically American levels of political ignorance.

Ending support to this notion of an ecology of political knowledge is the stability of American political ignorance over time. Since the 1940s, when social scientists began measuring it, political ignorance has remained virtually unchanged. It is hard to gauge the extent of political knowledge before that time, but there is little to suggest that there is some lost golden age in U.S. history. The storied 1858 debates between Senator Stephen Douglas and Abraham Lincoln, for example, though undoubtedly a high point in the nation’s public discourse, were also an anomaly. Public debates were rare in 19th-century political campaigns, and campaign rhetoric was generally overblown and aggressively partisan.

Modern measurements of Americans’ historical and political knowledge go back at least to 1943, when the New York Times surveyed college freshmen and found “a striking ignorance of even the most elementary aspects of United States history.” Reviewing nearly a half-century of data (1945–89) in What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters (1996), political scientists Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter conclude that, on balance, there has been a slight gain in Americans’ political knowledge, but one so modest that it makes more sense to speak of a remarkable stability. In 1945, for example, 43 percent of a national sample could name neither of their U.S. senators; in 1989, the figure was essentially unchanged at 45 percent. In 1952, 67 percent could name the vice president; in 1989, 74 percent could do so. In 1945, 92 percent of Gallup poll respondents knew that the term of the president is four years, compared with 96 percent in 1989. Whatever the explanations for dwindling voter turnout since 1960 may be, rising ignorance is not one of them.

As Delli Carpini and Keeter suggest, there are two ways to view their findings. The optimist’s view is that political ignorance has grown no worse despite the spread of television and video games, the decline of political parties, and a variety of other negative developments. The pessimist asks why so little has improved despite the vast increase in formal education during those years. But the main conclusion remains: no notable change over as long a period as data are available.

Low as American levels of political knowledge may be, a generally tolerable, sometimes admirable, political democracy survives. How? One explanation is provided by a school of political science that goes under the banner of “political heuristics.” Public opinion polls and paper-and-pencil tests of political knowledge, argue researchers such as Arthur Lupia, Samuel Popkin, Paul Sniderman, and Philip Tetlock, presume that citizens require more knowledge than they actually need in order to cast votes that accurately reflect their preferences. People can and do get by with relatively little political information. What Popkin calls “low-information rationality” is sufficient for citizens to vote intelligently.
This works in two ways. First, people can use cognitive cues, or “heuristics.” Instead of learning each of a candidate’s issue positions, the voter may simply rely on the candidate’s party affiliation as a cue. This works better in Europe than in America, but it still works reasonably well. Endorsements are another useful shortcut. A thumbs-up for a candidate from the Christian Coalition or Ralph Nader or the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People or the American Association of Retired Persons frequently provides enough information to enable one to cast a reasonable vote.

Second, as political scientist Milton Lodge points out, people often process information on the fly, without retaining details in memory. If you watch a debate on TV—and 46 million did watch the first presidential debate between President Bill Clinton and Robert Dole in 1996—you may learn enough about the candidates’ ideas and personal styles to come to a judgment about each one. A month later, on election day, you may not be able to answer a pollster’s detailed questions about where they stood on the issues, but you will remember which one you liked best—and that is enough information to let you vote intelligently.

The realism of the political heuristics school is an indispensable corrective to unwarranted bashing of the general public. Americans are not the political dolt they sometimes seem to be. Still, the political heuristics approach has a potentially fatal flaw: It subtly substitutes voting for citizenship. Cognitive shortcuts have their place, but what if a citizen wants to persuade someone else to vote for his or her chosen candidate? What may be sufficient in the voting booth is inadequate in the wider world of the democratic process: discussion, deliberation, and persuasion. It is possible to vote and still be disenfranchised.

Yet another response to the riddle of voter ignorance takes its cue from the Founders and other 18th-century political thinkers who emphasized the importance of a morally virtuous citizenry. Effective democracy, in this view, depends more on the “democratic character” of citizens than on their aptitude for quiz show knowledge of political facts. Character, in this sense, is demonstrated all the time in everyday life, not in the voting booth every two years. From Amitai Etzioni, William Galston, and Michael Sandel on the liberal side of the political spectrum to William J. Bennett and James Q. Wilson on the conservative side, these writers emphasize the importance of what Alexis de Tocqueville called “habits of the heart.” These theorists, along with politicians of every stripe, point to the importance of civil society as a foundation of democracy. They emphasize instilling moral virtue through families and civic participation through churches and other voluntary associations; they stress the necessity for civility and democratic behavior in daily life. They would not deny that it is important for citizens to be informed, but neither would they put information at the center of their vision of what makes democracy tick.

Brown University’s Nancy Rosenblum, for example, lists two essential traits of democratic character. “Easy spontaneity” is the disposition to treat others identically, without deference, and with an easy grace. This capacity to act as if many social differences are of no account in public settings is one of the things that make democracy happen on the streets. This is the disposition that foreign visitors have regularly labeled “American” for 200 years, at least since 1818, when the British reformer and journalist William Cobbett remarked upon Americans’ “universal civility.” Tocqueville observed in 1840 that strangers in America who meet “find neither danger nor advantage in telling each other freely what they think. Meeting by chance, they neither seek nor avoid each other. Their manner is therefore natural, frank, and open.”

Rosenblum’s second trait is “speaking up,” which she describes as “a willingness to respond at least minimally to ordinary injustice.” This does not involve anything so impressive as organizing a demonstration, but something more like objecting when an adult cuts ahead of a kid in a line at a movie theater, or politely rebuking a coworker who slurs a racial or religious group. It is hard to define “speaking up” precisely, but we all recognize it, without necessarily giving it the honor it deserves as an element of self-government.

We need not necessarily accept Rosenblum’s chosen pair of moral virtues. Indeed a Japanese or Swedish democrat might object that they look suspiciously like distinctively American traits rather than distinctively democratic ones. They almost evoke Huckleberry Finn. But turning our attention to democratic character reminds us that being well informed is just one of the requirements of democratic citizenship.

The Founding Fathers were certainly more concerned about instilling moral virtues than disseminating information about candidates and issues. Although they valued civic engagement more than their contemporaries in Europe did, and cared enough about promoting the wide circulation of ideas to establish a post office and adopt the First Amendment, they were ambivalent about, even suspicious of, a politically savvy populace. They did not urge voters to “know the issues”; at most they hoped that voters would choose wise and prudent legislators to consider issues on their behalf. On the one hand, they agreed that “the diffusion of knowledge is productive of virtue, and the best security for our civil rights,” as a North Carolina congressman put it in 1792. On the other hand, as George Washington cautioned, “however necessary it may be to keep a watchful eye over public servants and public measures, yet there ought to be limits to it, for suspicions unfounded and jealousies too lively are irritating to honest feelings, and oftentimes are productive of more evil than good.”
If men were angels, well and good—but they were not, and few of the Founders were as extravagant as Benjamin Rush in his rather scary vision of an education that would "convert men into republican machines." In theory, many shared Rush’s emphasis on education; in practice, the states made little provision for public schooling in the early years of the Republic. Where schools did develop, they were defended more as tutors of obedience and organs of national unity than as means to create a watchful citizenry. The Founders placed trust less in education than in a political system designed to insulate decision making in the legislatures from the direct influence of the emotional, fractious, and too easily swayed electorate.

All of these arguments—about America’s political environment, the value of political heuristics, and civil society—do not add up to a prescription for resignation or complacency about civic education. Nothing I have said suggests that the League of Women Voters should shut its doors or that newspaper editors should stop puffing politics on page one. People may be able to vote intelligently with very little information—even well-educated people do exactly that on most of the ballot issues they face—but democratic citizenship means more than voting. It means discussing and debating the questions before the political community—and sometimes raising new questions. Without a framework of information in which to place them, it is hard to understand even the simple slogans and catchwords of the day. People with scant political knowledge, as research by political scientists Samuel Popkin and Michael Dimock suggests, have more difficulty than others in perceiving differences between candidates and parties. Ignorance also tends to breed more ignorance; it inhibits people from venturing into situations that make them feel uncomfortable or inadequate, from the voting booth to the community forum to the town hall.

What is to be done? First, it is important to put the problem in perspective. American political ignorance is not growing worse. There is even an “up” side to Americans’ relative indifference to political and historical facts: their characteristic openness to experiment, their pragmatic willingness to judge ideas and practices by their results rather than their pedigree.

Second, it pays to examine more closely the ways in which people do get measurably more knowledgeable. One of the greatest changes Delli Carpini and Keeter found in their study, for example, was in the percentage of Americans who could identify the first 10 amendments to the Constitution as the Bill of Rights. In 1954, the year the U.S. Supreme Court declared school segregation unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education, only 31 percent of Americans could do so. In 1989, the number had moved up to 46 percent.

Why the change? I think the answer is clear: The civil rights movement, along with the rights-oriented Warren Court, helped bring rights to the forefront of the American political agenda and thus to public consciousness. Because they dominated the political agenda, rights became a familiar topic in the press and on TV dramas, sitcoms, and talk shows, also finding their way into school curricula and textbooks. Political change, this experience shows, can influence public knowledge.

This is not to say that only a social revolution can bring about such an improvement. A lot of revolutions are small, one person at a time, one classroom at a time. But it does mean that there is no magic bullet. Indeed, imparting political knowledge has only become more difficult as the dimensions of what is considered political have expanded into what were once nonpolitical domains (such as gender relations and tobacco use), as one historical narrative has become many, each of them contentious, and as the relatively simple framework of world politics (the Cold War) has disappeared.

In this world, the ability to name the three branches of government or describe the New Deal does not make a citizen, but it is at least a token of membership in a society dedicated to the ideal of self-government. Civic education is an imperative we must pursue with the full recognition that a high level of ignorance is likely to prevail—even if that fact does not flatter our faith in rationalism, our pleasure in moralizing, or our confidence in reform.

*There is no happy explanation for low voter turnout. “Voter fatigue” is not as silly an explanation as it may seem: Americans have more frequent elections for more offices than any other democracy. It is also true that the more-or-less steady drop in turnout starting in about 1960 coincided with the beginning of a broad expansion of nonelectoral politics that may have drained political energies away from the polling places: the civil rights movement, the antiwar demonstrations of the Vietnam years, the women’s movement, and the emergence of the religious Right. The decline in turnout may signify in part that Americans are disengaged from public life, but it may also suggest that they judge electoral politics to be disengaged from public issues that deeply concern them.

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