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1. The link between democracy and peace was considered by some to have been an important motivation behind the
   c. global support of the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
   d. addition of Turkey to the European Union in 2004.

2. When U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that “the fundamental character of regimes matter more today than
   the international distribution of power,” she was rejecting the theory of
   a. liberal institutionalism.
   b. economic structuralism.
   c. realism.
   d. postmodernism.

3. U.S. policy makers decided to invade Iraq in 2003 in part in order to introduce democracy into the region. If Iraq and
   other Middle Eastern states became democratic, which of the following did policy makers NOT consider would occur?
   a. States in the region would be more likely to make peace with Israel.
   b. Middle Eastern democracies would be less likely to harbor terrorists.
   c. States in the Middle East would distribute oil resources more fairly among their populace.
   d. New democracies in the region would be willing to make peace with the United States.

4. During the “Arab Spring” which of the following countries did not see a leader or regime swept from power?
   a. Jordan
   b. Egypt
   c. Libya
   d. Yemen

5. Why were many analysts worried about the fall of stable authoritarian regimes during the “Arab Spring?”
   a. It was believed that access to the region’s oil reserves would be curtailed.
   b. Analysts worried populist radical anti-western governments would take power.
   c. Scholars grew concerned that such events might threaten stable democratic regimes in sub-Saharan Africa and
   southern Europe.
   d. Many believed that this could set back economic development in the region by decades.
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6. According to the textbook, the definition of the state is the
   a. territorial boundaries of a country.
   b. government and political system of a country.
   c. political control of the military.
   d. executive branch of the government.

7. The primary difference between systemic and state level theories is that the former
   a. assumes that countries differ from one country and that they change over time.
   b. asks the question: What explains foreign policies?
   c. provides answers that are presumably valid regardless of the country.
   d. does not offer a general theory of all international politics.

8. What is one troubling implication of democratic peace theory?
   a. It shows how limited democracies are in their foreign policy decisions.
   b. It suggests that the United Nations is no longer relevant.
   c. It provides a rationale for democracies to engage in war to change a regime from authoritarianism to democracy.
   d. It shows that the realists may be correct in their belief that the type of government does not matter.

9. Democratic peace theory asserts that
   a. there is a connection between regime type and war.
   b. the balance of power in the international system is predictive of conflict.
   c. countries with stagnant economies are more likely to engage in war.
   d. religious fundamentalism is an important factor behind conflict.

10. The “simple” model of democratic peace theory argues that
    a. countries with large armies are more likely to engage in war.
    b. unequal distribution of the world’s resources is a major factor in conflict.
    c. democracies, in general, are more peaceful than autocracies.
    d. international organizations must play a smaller role in addressing conflict.
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11. In the book, *Perpetual Peace*, which author first laid out the argument for democratic peace theory?
   a. Karl Marx
   b. Thomas Hobbes
   c. Woodrow Wilson
   d. Immanuel Kant

12. The simple model of democratic peace theory largely has been
   a. discredited.
   b. proven accurate.
   c. incorporated into the foreign policies of many countries.
   d. widely accepted by democracies.

13. What is the difference between the simple model and the dyadic model of the democratic peace theory?
   a. The simple model states that democracies are more peaceful than all other forms of government, whereas the dyadic model says that democracies are more peaceful than communist governments but less peaceful than other types of governments.
   b. The simple model states that democracies are more peaceful in general whereas the dyadic model states only that democracies do not fight each other.
   c. The simple model is focused on all types of war, whereas the dyadic model is focused on only civil war.
   d. The simple model states that democracies are always peaceful, whereas the dyadic model states that democracies will avoid world war but may enter into war with a single opponent.

14. The rally-around-the-flag effect refers to the
   a. patriotic fervor that often exists in democratic societies.
   b. ability of a leader to increase his or her popularity by declaring war.
   c. widespread support for a legitimate war.
   d. policy of nationalism generally found in the developing world.

15. According to the dyadic model of democratic peace theory, democracies do not go to war with each other because
   a. of the characteristics of individual states.
   b. they have created a democratic balance of power.
   c. of the relations between certain types of states.
   d. they generally are weaker militarily than war-like states.
16. The author suggests all of the following explanations support the dyadic model of democratic peace theory except
   a. normative explanation.
   b. structural explanation.
   c. institutional explanation.
   d. hegemonic power explanation.

17. The democratic peace argument that focuses on the politics of compromise and commitment to promise is a
   a. structural explanation.
   b. normative explanation.
   c. rational choice explanation.
   d. simple democratic model.

18. The structuralist argument asserts that in democracies, political disputes are resolved by compromise and that this
carries over to foreign relations in all of the following ways except
   a. the politics of compromise that extends from domestic to foreign relations.
   b. the domestic processes of democracies lead to moderate solutions in foreign relations.
   c. democratic institutions force the government to maintain its commitments.
   d. democracies generally have stronger economies and can offer more foreign aid.

19. The cost of reneging on one’s commitments is known as
   a. public relations.
   b. mainstream effect.
   c. politics of compromise.
   d. audience costs.

20. The normative explanation for the democratic peace theory argues that
   a. democracies are unlikely to work out problems peacefully.
   b. democratic politicians are vulnerable if they lose a war.
   c. democracies respect the institutions of democracy in other countries as well as their own.
   d. these countries construct valuable institutions.
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21. What is the structural argument that supports the view that democracies do not go to war with each other?
   a. It focuses on the way that democracies often find it easier to reach compromise with each other.
   b. It asserts that democracies have a respect for each other that they do not have for non-democratic states.
   c. As democracies are very successful at fighting wars, democratic politicians are worried that they might lose a war with another democracy, which would make them vulnerable in upcoming elections, so they fear going to war with other democracies.
   d. It states that the three branches of government in a democracy and the related checks and balances make it much less likely for two democracies to enter into war with each other.

22. According to the author, what is an example of the rally-around-the-flag effect?
   a. In 2003, Spanish voters unseated a prime minister because of his support of the war in Iraq.
   b. In 2004, President Bush was reelected, showing the support of the American people for a President in a time of war.
   c. In early 2010, the president of North Korea launched a torpedo attack on a South Korean ship to show his toughness to other elites.
   d. After the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003, the Iraqi people rallied around the United States in support of their intervention.

23. How do audience costs help to explain the democratic peace?
   a. As the audience in a democracy is always against war, it is difficult for a democratic leader to enter into war.
   b. Audience costs no longer explain the democratic peace, as the audience in most democracies has a very weak knowledge of politics.
   c. Audience costs describe the cost to a political leader of reneging on a promise. As there are stronger audience costs in a democracy than in a non-democratic state, democratic leaders are less likely to break a promise and enter into war.
   d. Citizens and leaders in democracies respect the institutions of democracy, not only in their own country, but in other countries as well. They reject the idea of forcibly conquering another democracy.

24. Which democratic theory approach argues that democratic political institutions make democracies more cautious about going to war with one another?
   a. Normative explanation
   b. Institutional explanation
   c. Interdependence explanation
   d. Structural explanation
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25. Rational choice theorists argue that democratic political institutions have two effects on their leaders that make them cautious about going to war with one another: democratic states are more likely to win wars and
   a. leaders have a greater sensitivity to the political costs of losing a war.
   b. citizens are unlikely to support their government’s war efforts.
   c. conflict rarely solves the problem at hand.
   d. other democracies will intervene to prevent conflict.

26. The claim that democracies are less likely to go to war than autocracies is
   a. not correct statistically.
   b. entirely correct statistically.
   c. dependent on the period of study.
   d. ambiguous.

27. Studies about which state is the initiator of a given war show that democracies
   a. will often attack other democracies.
   b. often do the attacking.
   c. are almost always the victims of attacks by autocracies.
   d. rarely engage in war.

28. What is the institutional argument that supports the view that democracies do not go to war with each other?
   a. It focuses on the way that democracies often find it easier to reach compromise with each other.
   b. It asserts that democracies have a respect for each other that they do not have for nondemocratic states.
   c. As democracies are very successful at fighting wars, democratic politicians are worried that they might lose a war with another democracy. This would make them vulnerable in upcoming elections; so they fear going to war with other democracies.
   d. It states that the three branches of government in a democracy and the related checks and balances make it much less likely for two democracies to enter into war with each other.

29. In Michael Doyle’s study of war and democracy, he found that
   a. the only war fought between liberal democracies was World War I.
   b. from 1815 to 1980, there were no wars fought between liberal democracies.
   c. from 1815 to 1980, there were only three wars fought between liberal democracies.
   d. democracies frequently start wars with other democracies.
30. Across the developed world, voting behavior theorists have shown that
   a. the more education one has, the greater likelihood one will vote.
   b. participation in elections decreases as citizens age.
   c. members of the working class vote more often than those in the middle class.
   d. voting participation increases with age.

31. Which of the following is incorrect about youth voting?
   a. In recent German elections, more young people vote than do those in the United States.
   b. Roughly twice the level of Canadian youths voted recently than their American counterparts.
   c. Older voters in Germany vote more than do younger voters there.
   d. American youths vote at the same percentages as their European counterparts.

32. Which of the following is incorrect about voting requirements?
   a. Persons who fail to vote in Brazil cannot get a passport.
   b. Voting is compulsory for people of all ages in many Latin American countries.
   c. People who do not vote in Singapore can be caned, which is a form of corporal punishment.
   d. In some German regions voters as young as 16 may vote.

33. In the 2010 U.S. Congressional elections, approximately what percentage of people between the ages of 18 and 29 voted?
   a. 20 percent
   b. 33 percent
   c. 55 percent
   d. 75 percent

34. The operationalization of a concept refers to the ability of
   a. deconstructing a variable.
   b. identifying a concept in practice.
   c. making repairs to a concept in order to improve it.
   d. creating different views of the concept.
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35. One of the central critiques of the democratic peace theory is
   a. the evidence demonstrates that democracies frequently go to war.
   b. democracies have existed for a relatively long period of history.
   c. democracy is defined poorly and in contradictory ways.
   d. the definition of democracy remains static over time.

36. All of the following are fundamental criticisms of the democratic peace theory except
   a. the specific definition of democracy in practice.
   b. the few historic cases of democracies.
   c. the lack of data suggesting democracies do not fight other democracies.
   d. the nature of changes over time in the definition of democracy.

37. The idea of a “zone of peace” consisting of North American, Western Europe, and Japan implies
   a. the number of democracies can be expanded through war.
   b. an idealist view based on no legitimate data.
   c. war is inevitable outside this zone.
   d. this zone can be expanded to include more and more countries.

38. The criteria for membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are based on the concept of
   a. relative power.
   b. absolute power.
   c. conditionality.
   d. economic integration.

39. What organizations have attempted to put democratic peace theory into action?
   a. the United Nations
   b. NATO and the EU
   c. NAFTA and the EU
   d. the G-8 and the G-20
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40. According to the text, Freedom House is a(n)
   a. Washington-based NGO that assesses the state of democracy in the world.
   b. NGO that some has characterized as a “half-way house” for recent U.S. federal prison parolees.
   c. is an NGO based in Geneva, Switzerland that seeks commutation of death sentences for victims of human rights abuses in the Middle East and East Asia.
   d. a publisher of propaganda for the United States military.

41. Which three countries have not been admitted to the European Union?
   a. Turkey, Russia, and Ukraine
   b. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia
   c. Slovenia, Slovakia, and Czech Republic
   d. Bulgaria, Romania, and Malta

42. Woodrow Wilson was in favor of the United States involvement in World War I because
   a. he sought to create a balance against Russia.
   b. he assumed the United States could expand its power over Europe.
   c. it could help transform Europe into a region of peaceful democracies.
   d. international trade was threatened by a strong Germany.

43. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has grown from 16 member states to
   a. 26 members.
   b. 46 members.
   c. 36 members.
   d. 17 members.

44. Interestingly, while Woodrow Wilson was a founder of the League of Nations, the United States Senate
   a. was the last member to ratify the league.
   b. refused to ratify the charter.
   c. ratified the league based on certain membership conditions.
   d. ratified the league, but then broke from it a few years later.

45. In Woodrow Wilson’s view, an international organization to maintain peace could work only if
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a. the Austro-Hungarian empire was maintained.
b. its members were democracies.
c. the international order was based on balance of power.
d. Germany and Austria paid large reparations to France and Britain.

46. Which of Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” was enshrined in the Treaty of Versailles?
   a. The desire to saddle Germany with massive war reparations
   b. The notion that former empires would be broken up to allow for “national self-determination”
   c. To replace the autocratic rule in former empires with direct rule by victorious Great Powers
   d. The desire to free, unhindered navigation on the high seas

47. After the Soviet Union fell in 1991, who led the Russian Federation as its first president?
   a. Mikhail Gorbachev
   b. Vladimir Putin
   c. Boris Yeltsin
   d. Dmitri Medvedev

48. What event triggered the widespread unrest in the Middle East known as the “Arab Spring?”
   a. The suicide of a street vendor in Tunisia in 2010
   b. The success of an alleged U.S. computer virus in damaging Iran’s nuclear enrichment program
   c. The killing of Muammar Qaddafi by rebels in Libya
   d. The assassination of a Saudi prince in Washington, D.C. by Iranian spies

49. Which of the following is NOT a reason that Western leaders hesitated to ask Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak, to step down?
   a. Mubarak had maintained peace with Israel.
   b. His administration pursued a secular agenda in Egypt.
   c. He had repressed Islamist elements in society and had kept them out of power.
   d. He was a supporter of export tariffs on oil.

50. The dangers of democratization in the Middle East and North Africa had been shown more than twenty years ago in which country?
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a. Tunisia
b. Saudi Arabia
c. Jordan
d. Algeria

51. One implication of democratic peace theory is that it
   a. encourages democracies to ally with supportive autocracies.
   b. creates incentives for economic protectionism.
   c. reduces the influence of interest groups.
   d. provides a rationale for democracies to pursue regime change.

52. According to Katzenstein’s study, he found that ________ negotiates major economic policies with broad
    associations of industry and labor groups?
   a. France
   b. the United States
   c. Germany
   d. Japan

53. The issue of state strength has become quite important. According to this concept, since the United States is heavily
    influenced by interest groups, the United States is
   a. strong.
   b. quite autonomous.
   c. weak.
   d. divided.

54. According to the Katzenstein study, the United States
   a. is a strong state.
   b. is a weak state.
   c. has a positive balance between state and society.
   d. limits the influence of interest groups.

55. Who are the “Asian Tigers”?
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- a. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan
- b. China, Japan, Thailand, and Vietnam
- c. South Korea, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Japan
- d. Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, and China

56. What did the global economic crisis of 2008 show about the relationship between state and society?
   - a. States like China, where the state played a stronger role in the economy, fared worse than states like the United States, where the state played a smaller role in the economy.
   - b. In order to overcome the economic crisis, states must increase their role in society.
   - c. States like China, where the state played a stronger role in the economy, fared better than states like the United States, where the state played a smaller role in the economy.
   - d. It is more difficult for states like the United States to overcome the economic crisis, because they have so many actors in their decision-making process, such as interest groups and the media.

57. In terms of the study of interest groups, which of the following is true?
   - a. The role of interest groups has received less attention in the study of foreign policy than in the study of domestic politics.
   - b. Interest group activity and influence over foreign economic policy making is easy to determine.
   - c. The role of interest groups has received less attention in the study of domestic politics than in the study of foreign policy.
   - d. Interest groups are not an important part of the student of international politics.

58. Interest group motivations in foreign policy include all of the following except
   - a. winning contracts to sell goods or services to the government.
   - b. supporting foreign policies that are economically beneficial to the group.
   - c. promoting a particular cause or issue in foreign policy.
   - d. securing a stable government bureaucracy.

59. The type of individuals hired by interest groups to influence policy makers are called
   - a. leaders.
   - b. lobbyists.
   - c. followers.
   - d. bureaucrats.
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60. Which of the following is NOT a way interest groups use financial resources to influence policy makers?
   a. By making significant contributions to politicians’ campaign funds
   b. By conducting research on a specific issue and share the results with policy makers
   c. By going directly to the people by advertising
   d. By rigging voting machines.

61. Which former foreign dignitary, after leaving office as prime minister, actively supported an agreement with a Russian gas giant to build a pipeline linking Russia with Germany?
   a. Angela Merkel
   b. Vladimir Putin
   c. Gerhard Schröder
   d. Helmut Kohl

62. Although public opinion is an important consideration in policy decisions, what percentage of the public pays attention to foreign affairs?
   a. 5 to 10 percent
   b. 20 to 30 percent
   c. 50 to 60 percent
   d. 80 to 90 percent

63. What do researchers know about public opinion and foreign policy?
   a. Most citizens are very well informed and care about foreign policy.
   b. Most citizens have no interest in foreign policy, and they have very little knowledge of foreign affairs.
   c. Most citizens are very interested in foreign policy.
   d. Most citizens change their mind frequently about foreign policy issues.

64. Research on public opinion reveals that the public’s view on foreign policy is
   a. relatively unstable over time.
   b. vulnerable to rapid change, depending on the particular foreign policy issue.
   c. relatively stable over time.
   d. based on its wide knowledge and interest.
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65. Public opinion in the United States played a major role in
a. ending the Vietnam War.
b. the imposition of tariffs on Chinese steel.
c. joining the League of Nations.
d. establishing détente with the Soviet Union.

66. Latent public opinion refers to
a. active though superficial public opinion.
b. inactive opinion that can become very active.
c. the rising influence of public opinion in times of war.
d. the economic implications of foreign policy on public opinion.

67. Which of the following is NOT true?
 a. Elected officials in the United States generally do not have much sway over public opinion.
b. Much of the content of public opinion seems to be determined by elite views.
c. Public opinion becomes more important in determining policy outcomes when leaders disagree over an issue area.
d. The vast majority of people have informed, correct opinions on political issues.

68. The concept in which there is only one view expressed by leaders is called
a. the mainstream effect.
b. the butterfly effect.
c. dogmatic ideology.
d. latent public opinion.

69. Describing immigration in terms of either law breaking or as an economic benefit to society is considered
a. the mainstream effect.
b. framing the issue.
c. journalistic integrity.
d. public opinion bias.
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70. The news media play an important role in determining the agenda of public debate over foreign policy by
   a. providing objective information about an issue.
   b. hiring special interest groups to report on policies.
   c. expanding coverage of issues to the Internet.
   d. deciding what issues to cover.

71. The concept of yellow journalism is linked with the start of which war?
   a. World War I
   b. Spanish-American War
   c. Vietnam War
   d. Iraq War

72. Identify the three categories of critiques discussed in the text about the viability of the democratic peace theory. What do they entail? Do you agree or disagree with these critiques?

73. Most people accept the idea that the United States should help countries become democratic. What would be the best policies in order to achieve this? Do you favor or support the expansion of democracies around the world through military intervention?

74. Interest groups can have significant influence on a country’s foreign policy. What are the ways in which interest groups influence policy? What makes an interest group successful in attempting to influence a government’s foreign policy?

75. The textbook refers to the media, public opinion, and the state as the primary actors in shaping foreign policy. Describe how each one competes to be the driving force by explaining each of the three models of influence. Which model do you find to be the most persuasive?

76. What are the two major findings in the search for evidence that exists to prove the democratic peace theory?

77. Describe the rally-around-the-flag effect. What are some recent examples of this effect?

78. Examine how various media outlets may influence foreign policy and public opinion. Provide examples to support your arguments.

79. According to the text, who has the most sway over public opinion? Who does the public listen to and trust the most? Who would you say, personally, has the most sway among students of your age group?
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80. What are the two most important objections to the subject of national interest?

81. Identify and describe the two models of democratic peace theory and explore the various criticisms of each approach.